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In this paper, we use a unique sample of listed Chinese firms to examine the impact of 
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on corporate performance. Unlike widely examined 
U.S. plans, the Chinese ESOP resulted from a policy experiment that started in 1992. Before that 
time, China’s predominantly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not allow employee ownership. 
In 1992, the Chinese government took dramatic action by starting the process of corporatization, 
in which SOEs were allowed to be privatized through share ownership and become an 
incorporated company. When SOEs became a corporation, they were allowed to adopt an ESOP 
with the approval of regulatory authorities. This trial policy was terminated two years later when 
the government abruptly stopped approving new applications for ESOPs. Because the policy 
applied to all incorporated firms and its timing (from the start to the end) was exogenous to 
individual firms, this policy experiment provides us with an exogenous sample of Chinese 
ESOPs. 
ESOPs are typically used as a pension plan, as in the U.S., by linking employees’ retirement 
wealth to the long-run performance of the company’s stock. It is argued that by aligning the 
interests of employees and shareholders, ESOPs provide incentives for employees to increase 
their effort in production, thus enhancing company performance. Previous studies have examined 
the effect of ESOP adoption using Japanese, Korean, and U.S. data and have obtained mixed 
results. Consistent with the tax-saving benefit of ESOPs in the U.S., Gordon and Pound (1990) 
and Beatty (1995) document positive announcement and adoption effects. However, the effect on 
the post-adoption performance, which is indicative of employee incentives, is ambiguous. 
Kumbhakar and Dunbar (1993), Jones and Kato (1995), and Cin and Smith (2002) report higher 
post-adoption productivity for ESOP firms, while others, including U.S. GAO (1987) and Conte 
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et al. (1996), do not find a clear, positive effect of ESOPs on performance. Indeed, Conte et al. 
find that the relation between ESOPs and corporate performance runs in the opposite direction: 
while firms with higher financial returns are more likely to sponsor an ESOP, the adoption of an 
ESOP does not lead to better performance for such firms. This reverse causality points out 
potential endogeneity in these studies. By reviewing the literature of ESOPs, Blasi et al. (2003) 
show considerable diversity among outcomes about the performance-ESOP relation. 
With our unique sample of Chinese ESOPs, we are able to conduct a more direct 
investigation into this relation by highlighting the role of employee motivation. China’s 
economic reform has generated decades of economic growth at high levels. The factors behind 
the sustained growth appear to be complex and remain unresolved. It has been one of the major 
objectives of the Chinese government to motivate the employees of its SOEs and, as part of the 
economic reform agenda, the government introduced the ESOP purely as an incentive scheme. 
Despite the long debate among researchers and government officials on the use of ESOPs, the 
role of ESOPs in employee motivation appears to be well accepted. In particular, in the absence 
of well-designed incentive schemes in China, ESOPs can play a more important role in providing 
employee incentives than those in a developed corporate governance system. Our sample has 
another distinct advantage: because a Chinese ESOP does not provide a tax benefit, and 
employee shares in China play no role in corporate restructuring decisions, our results are not 
complicated by any tax saving or corporate control effects. 
Our sample consists of all 750 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the period 1996–2000 among which 251 adopted an 
ESOP. We compare performance between ESOP and non-ESOP firms by controlling for firm 
and industry characteristics. We examine several performance measures that include ROA, ROE, 
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Tobin’s q, and productivity. Our comprehensive examination of performance measures results in 
a consistent finding: ESOP firms do not perform differently from their non-ESOP counterparts. 
We obtain this finding from each of the performance measures and it holds in various robustness 
checks. This finding does not support the proposition that ESOPs improve corporate 
performance. On the other hand, the finding is consistent with the view that due to the free-rider 
problem, highly diffused equity ownership among employees under an ESOP does not 
meaningfully affect employee incentives and thus corporate performance. 
Our study provides the first evidence on Chinese ESOPs. The unique regulatory background 
and experimental nature of the ESOP in China distinguish our study from previous ones in two 
notable aspects. First, because the short-lived policy on the ESOPs provides a setting close to a 
natural experiment, our results are unlikely to suffer from endogeneity. Second, the Chinese 
ESOP was introduced solely as an employee incentive scheme, which is different from those in 
the U.S. and other countries that serve as alternative pension plans and involve complex 
governance issues. We also note that, in China, important incentive schemes that are common in 
a developed market, such as high-powered bonus plans and stock options, are either negligible or 
simply do not exist. Therefore, without the interaction with alternative incentive or governance 
mechanisms, the Chinese ESOP allows us to document clean evidence on the role of ESOPs in 
employee motivation, uncontaminated by the potential effects of tax-saving benefits, corporate 
control, and incentive contracting. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two testable hypotheses that we derive 
from economic theory for the effects of ESOP adoption on corporate performance. Section 3 
describes the institutional and policy background of the Chinese ESOP. Section 4 discusses the 
method and data that we use in our examination. Section 5 presents our main empirical results. 
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Section 6 concludes. 
2. Two competing hypotheses 
ESOPs can affect corporate performance in different ways that may or may not involve 
employee motivation. Factors other than employee motivation include tax benefits and corporate 
control motives that are shown to have immediate or short term effects on the firm’s post-ESOP 
adoption performance (see, e.g., Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Beatty, 1995). Economists are 
particularly concerned with the role of ESOPs in enhancing employee incentives because work 
incentives influence the firm’s sustainable performance in the longer run. Since Chinese ESOPs 
involve neither tax-saving benefits nor corporate-control motives, our sample presents a 
desirable setting that allows us to examine the performance-ESOP relation for the effect of 
employee motivation. 
Agency cost occurs in the modern corporation due to the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A reasonable approach to mitigating this problem is to make the 
workers, including the manager, the owner of the firm. Therefore, from agency theory, we expect 
to find a direct effect of ESOPs on employee motivation that works to improve the firm’s 
performance. This increased motivation directly derives from employees’ greater benefit in the 
firm’s improved performance. In addition, it is argued that ESOPs help develop a more 
productive corporate culture that, by encouraging employee participation and promoting group 
cooperation, further strengthens the positive effect of ESOPs on corporate performance 
(Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Craig, 1993; Kim and Ouimet, 2009). For such mechanisms we 
pose the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. By enhancing employee motivation, ESOPs improve corporate performance. 
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Therefore, there is a positive association between corporate performance and the adoption of 
ESOPs. 
Although this effect is theoretically appealing, its economic significance is debatable. The 
effectiveness of employee-incentive benefits depends on the strength of the underlying pay-
performance link. When equity shares in an ESOP are allocated to a large number of employees, 
it is inevitable that the resulting ownership is highly diffused; and hence, due to the well known 
free-rider problem, might not meaningfully increase employee motivation. This problem is 
aggravated by low-level employees whose individual efforts exert little influence on the firm’s 
aggregate performance and who essentially see no link between their individual effort and a 
perceivable personal benefit. 
To show this problem, Table 1 summarizes representative studies of ESOPs regarding the 
implied incentive strength of employee ownership. In a standard approach (see Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), we measure the incentive strength by the sensitivity of the value of an individual 
employee’s ownership to the firm’s total shareholder value. In the last column, the sensitivities 
show that for every $1,000 increase in shareholder value, the benefit to an average employee is 
4.8¢ with the Chinese plan, 1.5¢ with the U.S. plan, 1.4¢ with the Korean plan, and merely 0.9¢ 
with the Japanese plan. These numbers indicate that typically the incentive strength of ESOPs is 
weak. Some studies note this potential problem (e.g., Blasi et al. 1996; Ding and Sun, 2001) that 
is highlighted by the summarized findings in Table 1. Intuitively, for an ordinary employee 
whose effort exerts little influence on the firm, a reward of just a few cents for every $1,000 
contribution would logically mean little motivation. Because incentive strength does not add up 
across employees, the law of free-riding is expected to dictate near-zero incentives for individual 
employees when the firm’s sizeable equity shares are allocated to thousands of employees. In the 
scenario of serious free riding, we have the following competing hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2. With highly diffused employee ownership, ESOPs do not effectively enhance 
employee motivation. Therefore, there is no association between corporate performance and the 
adoption of ESOPs. 
3. Employee stock ownership plans in China 
The Chinese ESOP has two distinct features: It is a direct product of China’s economic 
reform that started in the late 1970s, and was introduced purely as an employee incentive scheme. 
The main objective of the reform was to introduce market-economy mechanisms into the old 
system of central planning to improve resource-allocation efficiency and increase productivity. 
Ever since the beginning of the reform, the Chinese government’s continuing objective has been 
to enhance employee work incentives for its state-owned enterprises, which are legally owned by 
the state and administered by central, provincial, or local governments. Early reform measures 
included increasing managerial decision autonomy and implementing incentive-based corporate 
tax schemes. Although such measures seemed useful in improving the productivity of SOEs in 
the 1980s (Groves et al., 1994; Jefferson et al., 1996; Li, 1997), their roles were constrained by 
complex institutional and market conditions and thus did not generate sustained performance. In 
the early 1990s, the government introduced more drastic reform measures that were intended to 
change the ownership structure of SOEs. The implementation of what was called the “share-
ownership scheme” started the corporatization process under which the Chinese government 
allowed SOEs to be privatized.1 Small firms could be privatized through restructuring, and 
middle- and large-sized firms could be partially privatized through “share-issue privatization,” by 
                                                 
1 Jiang et al. (2009) show that the privatization of Chinese SOEs has become more effective in 
enhancing firm profitability after the capital market has become more developed. 
 8
listing on the two national stock exchanges, SHSE and SZSE. 
The ESOP was introduced as a by-product of the corporatization process. Employee stock 
ownership did not exist in China until May 1992, when China’s Economic System Reform 
Commission (CESRC) announced trial policies for corporatization.2 Under such policies, a state-
owned enterprise could be restructured and transferred into a limited liability company held by 
multiple shareholders.3 At the time of being incorporated, the company was allowed to issue a 
portion of equity shares to its employees. Incorporated companies can apply for public listing 
subject to approval by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
This wave of corporatization substantially changed the ownership structure of Chinese firms. 
After ownership restructuring and depending on its owners’ background, a previously state-
owned firm would typically have five types of shares: state shares, legal-person shares, employee 
shares, domestic-individual shares, and foreign shares. State shares are held by central, 
provincial, or local governments; or by solely government-owned enterprises. Legal-person 
shares are those held by domestic institutions, including insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
other enterprises, of which many are partially owned by governments at different levels. 
In the early stage, applications for an ESOP were handled by local government authorities; 
and, due to a lack of effective monitoring, irregularities were common. For instance, it was 
required that a firm’s employee ownership should not exceed 20% of the firm’s total equity 
shares. Not all firms followed this requirement and some issued more shares to their employees. 
                                                 
2 Chen et al. (1997) compile, in great detail, laws and regulatory rules enacted until the mid 1990s 
regarding incorporation and securities in China.  
3 An incorporated company must have at least three start-up shareholders. Usually, state agents and 
local institutions that have financial or business links with the company act as the start-up shareholders. 
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Initially, employee shares were allowed to trade immediately after the stock was listed and the 
market treated such shares the same as publicly held stocks. Because the shares under an ESOP 
were issued at the stock’s par value, there was typically a large discount and employees 
immediately benefited upon the listing of the stock. Thus, the ESOP was quickly recognized as a 
way to transfer the wealth of state-owned companies to employees and managers. This potential 
benefit stimulated all eligible firms to apply for an ESOP or plan to apply. 
In response to early irregularities, the state regulatory authority issued more stringent rules on 
the issuing and trading of employee shares. In April 1993, the CESRC released urgent regulatory 
measures for tightening up on the issuance of employee stock shares. The measures became 
effective immediately, substantially slowing down the pace of ESOP approval. The measures 
also stipulated that employee shares could not be transferred in any way to non-employees and, 
when the stock was listed, employee shares could not trade until three years later. This 
stipulation affected all firms with an approved ESOP, of which many eventually went public. 
The latter companies present the majority of the ESOP firms included in our sample. 
In July 1993, the CESRC announced more comprehensive rules on issuing employee shares. 
Although the CESRC stuck to the existing restrictions on the transaction and transfer of 
employee ownership, the new rules made a significant change by lowering the maximum level of 
employee shares from the previous 20% to a mere 2.5%. 
The year-old practice of ESOPs did not seem to generate any quick positive effects on 
company performance. Instead, it created unexpected problems and irregularities (Chen et al., 
1997; Chen, 2006), which urged the regulatory authority to reassess the experiment. A few 
months later, the CESRC moved to completely suspend all ESOP applications. A regulatory 
notice was released in June 1994 that officially ended the process of adopting ESOPs. While no 
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more applications have been approved since then, all previously approved ESOPs are still subject 
to the rules enacted in April and July of 1993. 
Even though the process of adopting ESOPs ended in 1994, there has been a continuing 
debate among researchers and the public on the roles of ESOPs. This debate was renewed by the 
wave of public listings of China’s major banks in 2006. As a consequence of China’s entry into 
the World Trade Organization, there were increasing pressures on the Chinese government to 
speed up the reform of its predominantly state-owned banks. Consequently, top four banks have 
gone public since 2005 and more are expected to follow. Along with this significant financial-
sector reform, major banks have suggested that the government renew the policy on ESOPs and 
allow banks to allocate equity shares to their employees. As a response, the Governor of China’s 
Central Bank, Dr. Xiaochuan Zhou, commented publicly on the policy (Chen, 2006). Although 
he cautioned about the use of ESOPs and called for attention to the chaotic situation during the 
earlier experiment, his comments hinted at the possibility that China may again allow firms to 
adopt ESOPs. 
The policy experiment with ESOPs in China presents a unique experiment in which the 
factors in the firm’s adoption of the ESOP are largely exogenous. These factors reflected China’s 
economic reform policies and complex political constrains, but were irrelevant to incentive 
contracting at the individual firm level. Indeed, when the two national stock exchanges were 
established in 1990, the general public in China had little knowledge about securities markets, 
and, even years after that, there were serious doubts about the function of stock markets. This is 
the background when China’s economic reform authority proposed ESOPs. Managers of state-
owned companies in the early 1990s were totally unfamiliar with the concept of ownership 
incentives. However, they had no problem in realizing ESOPs’ potential benefit to employees. 
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On the other hand, whether and when a firm’s application for adopting an ESOP could be 
approved depended on the official approving process, which was handled by varying local 
governments. This process was usually slow, unpredictable, and irregular. When the June 1994 
announcement was released to terminate the experimental policy, many firms missed the 
opportunity to adopt an ESOP simply because they had either applied late or their applications 
had been delayed by the inefficient bureaucracy. 
The lack of alternative incentive schemes in China further highlights the natural-experiment 
feature of Chinese ESOPs. In the 1990s, important incentive mechanisms that are common in a 
developed market, such as high-powered bonus plans, restricted stock awards, and stock options, 
were either negligible or simply did not exist in China. Therefore, potential employee incentives 
from ESOPs could not interact with alternative incentive mechanisms. 
4. Method and data 
4.1. Empirical model 
Chinese firms adopt ESOPs before going public; so there is no information publicly available 
on performance surrounding the adoption and we cannot examine the change in performance 
from the pre-adoption period to the post-adoption period. In this study, we focus on cross-
sectional comparisons of performance over a post-adoption period between ESOP and non-
ESOP firms. Specifically, we investigate the first few years after the firm goes public during 
which employee shares are subject to stringent regulatory restrictions on transfer and transaction. 
We examine several performance measures that include ROA, ROE, Tobin’s q, and productivity. 
Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of long-term 
debt over the book value of total assets. Following previous studies of Chinese firms (e.g., Sun 
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and Tong, 2003; Chen et al., 2009), we also examine the return on sales (ROS), which is the ratio 
of net income to sales. Furthermore, we examine IPO pricing to see whether the market values 
ESOP and non-ESOP firms are different at that time. 
Many firm variables can affect these performance measures. Firm size and industry, in 
particular, are two important factors that affect both corporate performance and incentive 
contracts. We control for these two factors by constructing matching firms with which we match 
ESOP with non-ESOP firms. Ownership structure presents another important factor affecting the 
performance of Chinese firms. Qi et al. (2000), Sun and Tong (2003), and Wei et al. (2005) find 
company performance has an association with state and legal-person shares. Financial leverage is 
also relevant and, as shown in Qi et al. (2000), Sun and Tong (2003), Yuan et al. (2008), and 
Margaritisa and Psillaki (2010), its effect can be complex. Bai and Wang (1998) argue that 
financial leverage in China’s state-owned enterprises reflects Kornai’s (1980) soft budget 
constraint that adversely affects firm performance. Wang (2011) suggests that the interaction of 
financial leverage with managerial entrenchment affects the firm’s payout policy and shareholder value. 
In addition, the timing of a firm’s incorporation might also have a link to its performance, 
because it might reflect the firm’s stage of development and hence can be associated with certain 
levels or patterns of production. 
Our baseline empirical model has the following specification: 
 titk
n
tnniti  τα  CVγ  ESOP β Y ε++++= ∑ ,                             (1) 
where tiY  represents firm i’s performance (ROA, ROE, ROS, or Tobin’s q) in year t. iESOP  is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm adopts an ESOP, and zero otherwise. The 
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second term, ∑ ×
n
tnn CVγ , represents a set of control variables that capture firm characteristics. 
These variables are the logarithm of total assets, debt-to-equity ratio, state shares and legal-
person shares as a percentage of the firm’s total shares, and firm age. Firm age is calculated as 
the number of years from a firm’s incorporation to its listing. kα  represents industry effects, 
which captures time-invariant industry heterogeneity. We note that the manufacturing sector 
represents 60% of our sample firms and the CSRC industry classification further divides the 
manufacturing sector into ten subsectors. Therefore, we use 22 dummy variables to differentiate 
between the industry sectors (12 broad industry sectors and ten manufacturing subsectors). tτ  
represents year effects, which captures technological change and macroeconomic or market 
factors that are common to all firms. tiε  is the error term that follows a normal distribution. 
Our main focus is on the coefficient of the ESOP dummy, β . When ESOPs are effective in 
enhancing employee motivation, we expectβ  to be significantly positive (Hypothesis 1). On the 
other hand, in the presence of a serious free-rider problem, we expect β  to be statistically 
nonsignificant from zero (Hypothesis 2). 
4.2. Data 
Our sample consists of all firms listed on China’s two stock exchanges, SHSE and SZSE, 
from January 1996 to December 2000. We exclude firms listed before 1996 because some of the 
firms listed in the early years did not follow the regulatory requirement for holding employee 
shares from trading for three years after its public listing. With this exclusion, we also mitigate 
potential problems associated with market irregularities and policy changes in the early 1990s 
when China’s stock markets were in the early stages of development. In addition, the number of 
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ESOP firms that went public after 2000 becomes very small, so we also exclude firms listed after 
2000. 
We obtain our data from two widely used databases of Chinese firms. We use the financial 
information database, GTIOne, distributed by Genius Information Technology Co. GTIOne 
provides corporate financial data and information on ownership structure and the date of the IPO. 
Our other source is the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting Research Database distributed by 
Guo Tai, An Information Technology Co., from which we obtain information on stock-price 
performance. 
In Table 2, Panel A summarizes the firm listings on the two stock exchanges during the years 
1996–2000. In this period, total 750 firms were listed of which 251 had an ESOP. The first row 
shows a clear pattern of diminishing listings for ESOP firms, which is consistent with the fact 
that no ESOPs were approved after June 1994. On the other hand, the listing of non-ESOP firms 
is relatively stable during this period. We confine our examination to the first six years after the 
firm’s listing, including the IPO year. Because employee shares become publicly tradable three 
years after listing, the six-year examination window covers the three years under regulatory 
constraints on employee shares transactions and the three years without such constraints.4 
Panel B shows the industry composition of the sample firms. Following the industry-
classification guideline announced by CSRC, Chinese firms are classified into 13 broad 
industries.5 More than half of the firms, either with or without an ESOP, fall into the 
manufacturing sector. Except for the conglomerate sector, the industry distribution does not 
                                                 
4 Because our sample covers the 1996-2003 data period, companies listed in 1999 and 2000 have 
observations of less than six years. 
5 The industry classification guideline is available at CSRC’s official website (www.csrc.gov.cn). 
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show clear differences between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of employee ownership as a percentage of the firm’s total 
shares in the IPO year. The second column presents the percentage based on the firm’s total 
tradable and non-tradable shares. State shares and legal-person shares are both non-tradable 
shares.6 The average aggregate employee ownership under the ESOP is 12%, which is close to 
the employee ownership level under U.S. ESOPs (e.g., Conte et al., 1996) but substantially 
higher than that under Japanese plans (Jones and Kato, 1995) and Korean plans (Cin and Smith, 
2002). The distribution shows a large cross-firm variation in employee ownership. Among the 
251 firms with an ESOP, 35 have employee ownership higher than 20%. Apparently, most of 
these firms adopted their ESOP before 1994 and did not meet the regulatory requirement for the 
employee-ownership ceiling of 20%. The forth column presents the distribution of employee 
shares as the percentage of total tradable shares only. The percentages are substantially higher, of 
which 16 even exceed the firm’s total tradable shares. 
To deal with potential data error and outliers, we winsorize the performance data by 
removing the top and bottom 1% of the observations for each of the performance measures. We 
then construct the matching sample. For each ESOP firm, we identify a matching firm from the 
non-ESOP group. The choice of the matching firm satisfies the following conditions: it must be 
listed in the same year as the ESOP firm, it must be in the same industry (based on the CSRC 
industry classification of 13 broad industry sectors) in that year, and have a size similar as the 
                                                 
6 There has been an increasing concern of both regulators and investors that the dismal performance 
of Chinese stocks in the past few years might partly be due to the existence of massive illiquid non-
tradable shares. A regulatory change took place in 2006 that allows firms to gradually convert non-
tradable shares to tradable shares. 
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ESOP firm. We measure firm size by sales and require the matching firm’s sales be between 70 
and 130% of the ESOP counterpart. This matching process results in 189 pairs of ESOP and non-
ESOP firms that are matched by size, industry, and listing year. 
As a robustness check, we also examined other size variables, such as the firm’s total assets 
and market capitalization. With such alternative size variables, we find no meaningful 
differences to our main results. Therefore, we only report and discuss the results obtained using 
sales as the size measure. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of selected firm variables. Panel A shows the statistics for 
the total sample and Panel B for the matched sample, separating ESOP firms from non-ESOP 
firms. For the total sample, although the statistics do not seem to differ much between ESOP and 
non-ESOP firms, there are some notable differences. First, on average, ESOP firms are smaller 
than non-ESOP firms. This size difference might reflect the difference in industry composition 
between the two groups. As shown in Table 2, while more non-ESOP firms are in the mining and 
manufacturing sectors, which are typically large companies, relatively more ESOP firms are in 
the sectors of wholesale and retail trade, real estate, and conglomerate. Second, firm age is two to 
three years older for ESOP firms than for non-ESOP firms. This difference is related to the fact 
that all ESOP firms were incorporated before June 1994 when the trial policy on ESOPs was 
officially ended. Third, ESOP firms have an average state ownership of about 25%, while the 
average ownership is as high as 33% for non-ESOP firms. This observation squares with the fact 
that ESOP firms allocated an average of 12% of their total equity shares to their employees. 
Panel B shows the statistics for the matched sample. After differences in industry 
composition and size distribution between the two groups are removed, the matched sample 
indicates similar firm characteristics between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. The controlled 
 17
homogeneity in size is of particular importance, because firm size is associated with both firm 
performance measures and incentive intensity measures and the associations are nonlinear and 
difficult to control ideally. For comparison purposes, in our discussions we will report empirical 
results for both the total sample and the matched sample. 
Table 5 compares the long-term changes of tradable shares between ESOP and non-ESOP 
firms. The numbers indicate a sharp difference in the over-time changes between the two groups. 
All firms’ tradable shares increase consistently after the IPO. For non-ESOP firms, the increase 
is relatively stable, mostly at a rate of 15 to 20% per year. However, for ESOP firms, the increase 
is markedly elevated in the third and fourth years, reaching an average rate of as high as 70%. 
The difference between the two groups in these two years is large and statistically significant. 
This difference directly results from the ESOPs under which employee shares become regular 
tradable shares after three years and the change is indicated in the firm’s annual report for the 
third or fourth fiscal year. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Base regressions 
Table 6 presents the total-sample regressions of the four performance measures, ROA, ROE, 
ROS, and Tobin’s q, on the adoption of the ESOP. The regressions control for firm 
characteristics and include industry and year fixed effects, and the results are qualitatively 
similar between the total-sample and the matched-sample regressions. The key parameter 
estimate is the coefficient on the ESOP dummy, which has mixed signs and is statistically 
nonsignificant from zero in all of the regressions (except one that is marginally significant with 
the total sample). The consistently small magnitude and low significance level of this coefficient 
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reject Hypothesis 1 that predicts better performance for ESOP firms. On the other hand, this 
observation supports Hypothesis 2, which shows a statistically insignificant difference in the 
performance between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. 
The coefficients for the control variables are mostly consistent with previous studies, giving 
us four observations. First, there is a significant size effect on the performance measures. The 
coefficient on the logarithm of total assets is significantly positive in the regressions on the three 
return performance measures and significantly negative in the regression on Tobin’s q. Because 
Tobin’s q  is also a proxy for growth potential and declines as firms grow, the difference between 
it and the returns is expected. 
Second, the debt-to-equity ratio has a significantly negative effect on firm performance. This 
result is inconsistent with standard capital structure theory that predicts higher default risk and 
thus higher returns for firms with higher financial leverage. On the other hand, a negative effect 
for debt is in line with the soft-budget constraint theory (Kornai, 1980). Since our firms are 
mostly owned or controlled by the state and are more likely to have a soft-budget constraint 
problem, it is not unexpected that firms with more debt perform poorly compared with those with 
less debt. 
Third, the coefficients on state shares and legal-person shares suggest a complex link 
between company performance and ownership structure, and this link differs between the 
performance measures. Previous studies (e.g., Qi et al., 2000) do not give conclusive results on 
this link. Indeed, there is a debate on the roles of legal-person shares and state shares in China 
regarding corporate governance. Since legal persons are mostly state-owned or controlled 
companies or institutions and any shares held by legal persons are essentially indirect state shares, 
the monitoring role of legal-person shares is unlikely to be fundamentally different from that of 
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state shares.7 Chen et al. (2009) argue that different types of owners have different objectives and 
motivations, and show that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior 
to certain types of state ownership. Ng. et al. (2009) argue that the relation between state shares 
and performance is convex. 
Further, firm age has a negative association with the performance measures. One possible 
explanation for this result is that firms time their decision to become incorporated. When firms 
can choose a favorable time for incorporation, their post-incorporation performance should 
decline in a way similar to IPO long-run performance (Ritter, 1991). In China, a firm needs at 
least three start-up shareholders to sponsor its application for incorporation. Hence, the firm 
might have a strong incentive to time the decision so as to attract important institutional investors 
and “window-dress” its performance. And the effect of such firm behaviors should be more 
evident with the accounting performance measures such as ROA and ROE. 
These total-sample regressions do not allow the ESOP effect to change with years, so it is 
possible that this effect does not show up in the total sample because it is time variant. Jones and 
Kato (1995) show that in their Japanese sample, the ESOP effect is negative in the first year after 
a firm adopts the ESOP and the effect turns positive in the third year. For this reason, we also run 
the by-year regressions for each of the six firm-data years. 
Table 7 summarizes the coefficient on the ESOP dummy for the by-year regressions of all 
four performance measures. Since the coefficients on the control variables give few additional 
insights, we do not report them in this table. Out of a total of 48 parameter estimates for the 
                                                 
7 Hence, legal persons in China are quite different from institutional shareholders in the U.S., who, as 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) argue, “serve an important monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem 
between shareholders and managers.” 
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effect of ESOPs, only one is statistically significant and three marginally significant, with 
inconsistent signs. The t-ratios are mostly small and the signs are mixed. Reinforcing our 
observation from Table 6, these by-year regressions show no meaningful differences in 
performance between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. 
Jones and Kato (1995) suggest that the ESOP effect is likely to show up in the third year after 
adopting an ESOP. Since the majority of the ESOP firms in our sample went public a few years 
after they adopted the plan, if there is a positive effect, this effect should be evident for at least a 
few years after listing. Our results apparently do not support this empirical regularity. 
To further confirm our findings, we also examine alternative model specifications. To 
capture the ownership effect, we use employee ownership as a percentage of total shares, instead 
of using a dummy variable for the ESOP group, in the regressions. To allow a nonlinear effect, 
we use quadratic forms for employee ownership and for the control variables. We also estimate 
the models by removing industry dummies in order to avoid potential problems arising from 
time-invariant effects of ESOPs. In all alternative regressions, our results remain qualitatively the 
same as those reported in Tables 6 and 7. We conclude that the evidence from the regressions of 
the three accounting return performance measures and Tobin’s q indicates no difference in 
performance between firms with an ESOP and those without. 
5.2. Productivity 
To identify the effect of ESOPs, many previous studies also examine the firm’s productivity 
(e.g., Jones and Kato, 1995; Cin and Smith, 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008). Following this literature, 
we further compare productivity between ESOP and non-ESOP firms, using two models for the 
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where tiQ  is firm i’s total output in year t, which we calculate as total sales minus direct operating 
costs as an approximation to value added; tiK  represents total capital; and tiL  represents total 
employees. The control variables in (2), including industry and year effects, are similarly defined 
as in model (1). The second model we estimate uses a Translog production function: 
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Table 8 presents the regressions for the two production functions. Because the data on labor are 
only available beginning in 1999, the regressions in this table are run for the period of 1999–2003. 
In all four regressions, the coefficient on the ESOP dummy is very small and statistically 
nonsignificant from zero. Consistent with our examination of the accounting returns and Tobin’s q, 
the productivity models show little difference between the two groups, strengthening the notion 
that ESOPs do not impact company performance. While it again rejects Hypothesis 1, this result 
lends further support to Hypothesis 2. 
Two additional observations are worth noting on the coefficients on capital and labor in the 
Cobb-Douglas production regressions (the first and third columns). First, the sum of the two 
coefficients is close to 1.1, indicating increasing returns to scale. Second, the coefficient on capital 
is close to one, while that on labor is only 10%. The substantially low marginal product of labor is 
in stark contrast to the usual case with developed economies. Together with the statistics shown in 
Table 4, this second observation indicates that the production of Chinese firms in the 1990s was 
labor intensive and characterized by low levels of labor productivity. 
5.3. Robustness 
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Table 3 shows that 35 firms with an ESOP have employee ownership higher than the 
regulatory upper limit of 20% of total equity shares. Although such firms only represent a small 
minority (less than 14% of the ESOP sample), they can potentially affect our test if they are 
inherently different from other firms and have a different motivation for adopting the ESOP. To 
clarify, we first compare summary statistics between these 35 firms and other ESOP firms, and 
then run the regressions in Tables 6–8 specifically for them. The summary statistics do not show 
any notable difference between these firms and other ESOP firms. In particular, with the various 
performance measures, we find no meaningful difference in performance between these firms and 
non-ESOPs. 
We have so far ignored potential effects of corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), seasoned equity offerings (SEO), share repurchases, and debt issuances. To conduct 
robustness checks in this regard, we identify corporate events from Wind Financial Database 
distributed by Wind Info, a leading financial data and software provider in China. During the 
period of 1996–2003, which our performance data cover, M&As with Chinese firms were quite 
frequent; each year, about 30% of all firms experience a M&A event. The frequency of the events 
shows little difference between ESOPs and non-ESOPs, while it increases slowly over time in the 
six years after the firm is listed. On the other hand, other corporate events were scarce during the 
sample period; each year, about 1% or less of firms experience a corporate event other than a 
M&A. With our sample, there are a total of 47 SEOs, 2 repurchases, 27 debt issues, and no debt 
retirement, of which the distributions do not show a clear difference between ESOPs and non-
ESOPs. We use dummy variables for the corporate events and add them, in various manners, to the 
regression models in Tables 6–8: using the M&A dummy, SEO dummy, other corporate events 
dummy (all events except M&A) separately, and using all event dummy variables together. Our 
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regression results with the event dummy variables change little from those we discuss above, again 
showing no meaningful difference in performance between ESOPs and non-ESOPs. 
5.4. Stock valuation 
In an efficient market, the price of the firm’s stock follows its fundamental value. If ESOPs 
play a significant role in enhancing employee incentives, this role should be translated into 
improved fundamentals and thus higher market value. Therefore, if an ESOP firm is superior to 
an otherwise equivalent non-ESOP firm, then at the time when they are listed, the market should 
price the stock with an ESOP higher than that without it. Based on this prediction, we compare 
stock valuation between the ESOP group and the non-ESOP group by focusing on the pricing of 
their IPOs. 
Table 9 presents the result for this comparison, and from which we obtain two interesting 
observations. First, the first-day closing price (the first row on Panels A and B) shows that the 
market is indifferent to valuing the new stock between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. In support of 
this finding, the matched sample, which removes size and industry heterogeneity between the 
two groups, indicates a nonsignificant difference between the two groups in the market 
capitalization of total tradable shares at the first-day closing price. This observation is in line 
with our findings from other performance measures, including Tobin’s q in particular, and casts 
further doubt on the proposition that ESOPs improve corporate performance. 
In case non-tradable shares make a difference, we also compare the market value of non-
tradable shares at the first-day closing price between the two groups. Just as with tradable shares, 
we find no meaningful difference in the value of non-tradable shares between ESOP and non-
ESOP stocks. 
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We note that the potential market imperfections of the Chinese equity market might cause 
inefficient market behaviors, so it is possible that the pricing information in the immediate 
aftermarket does not reflect the effect of ESOPs.8 However, although market inefficiency can 
contribute to our observation, we suspect that the role of this potential factor is very limited. The 
accounting return performance measures we examine earlier are more indicative of the firm’s 
fundamentals, which are not likely to be affected by market inefficiency. Moreover, the q 
measure, which directly depends on equity market valuation, does not show any meaningful 
effect from ESOPs even several years after the stock is listed. 
Our second observation is that ESOP stocks are offered at higher prices than are non-ESOP 
stocks. This finding is particularly strong with the matched sample, where the average offer price 
of ESOP stocks is 17.4% higher than that of non-ESOP stocks. Given our first observation that 
the firm’s fundamental value is unaffected by the ESOP, the implication of higher offer prices 
for ESOP stocks seems apparent. When the manager and employees of the issuing firm with an 
ESOP see a direct link between the new issue price and their personal wealth in employee shares, 
the firm should have a stronger incentive to negotiate for a higher offer price. The rationale here 
is that to raise the same amount of equity capital, a higher offer price causes less dilution to 
existing equity, including employee shares. 
As a result of the same fundamental values but different offer prices, the initial return is 
different between ESOP and non-ESOP stocks. The initial return, calculated as the first-day 
closing price minus the offer price divided by the offer price, is significantly lower for ESOP 
firms than for non-ESOP firms. The difference is highly significant statistically and 
economically; with the matched sample, for instance, the average initial return for ESOP firms is 
                                                 
8 Eun and Huang (2007) examine market imperfections of the Chinese equity market. 
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only 50% of that for non-ESOP firms. This finding appears to suggest different negotiation 
mechanisms between the two groups of issuers in setting the offer price. Further research is 
needed before one can draw a conclusion on this interesting issue.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the effect of ESOPs on corporate performance by using a sample 
of Chinese ESOPs that results from a unique policy experiment. After examining a variety of 
performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin’s q, and productivity, we find no 
meaningful difference in performance between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. This finding is 
obtained with each of the performance measures and holds in various robustness checks. 
Consistent with this observation, the equity market values ESOP and non-ESOP stocks 
indifferently. Reinforcing the findings of some previous studies such as Conte et al. (1996), our 
test casts further doubts on the presumed role of ESOPs in providing useful employee incentives. 
On the other hand, our finding supports the prediction of contract theory that highly diffused 
ownership does not induce meaningful work incentives. Because equity shares under an ESOP 
are typically allocated to a large number of employees, such plans are likely to incur a serious 
free-rider problem and hence are ineffective in motivating employees. 
Our finding has a direct implication for employee stock option plans, which, by allowing 
diffused stock option holdings by employees, are also likely to suffer from a free-rider problem. 
Since the 1990s, stock options have become a popular form of compensation to ordinary 
employees as well as to managers (Hall and Murphy, 2003). Proponents of this compensation 
practice applaud the stock-option role in tying the long-term interests of employees and the firm. 
But the evidence to date for the performance effect of employee stock options is scarce. 
 26
However, this is not totally unexpected because an employee stock option plan usually allocates 
less than 10% of the firm’s shares in options to its employees. By calibrating U.S. data, Oyer and 
Schaefer (2005) reach a similar conclusion. Hall and Murphy even consider this problem a 
troubling factor for employee stock options. 
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Table 1. Employee Incentive Strength under Representative ESOPs 
This table summarizes the incentive strength of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) from some existing studies that use U.S., Japanese, Korean, and 
Chinese data. Sample size is the number of firms that adopt an ESOP. Average ESO is the aggregate number of employee shares held under the ESOP as a 
percentage of the firm’s total shares. The incentive strength is calculated as the average ESO per employee, which measures the dollar increase in the value 
of an employee’s ownership for every $1,000 increase in the firm’s shareholder value. 
 
Country Sample size Data year Average ESO Employees in ESOP 
Incentive 
strength of ESOP 
U.S. (Chang and Mayers, 1992) 276 1976–1989 9.2 %  6,000 a $0.015 
Japan (Jones and Kato, 1995) 109 1973–1980 0.9 %  9,772 b $0.009 
Korea (Cin and Smith, 2002) 336 1996–1997 2.2 % 1,623  $0.014 c 
China (this study) 251 1996–2000 12.0 %  2,496  $0.048 
 
a. A conservative estimate from Conte et al. (1996, Table 2). 
b. An estimate from Jones and Kato (1995, Table 1). 
c. Two year average from Cin and Smith (2002, Tables 6 and 7). 
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Table 2. Listing and Industry Composition of Sample Firms 
The sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1996 to 
December 2000 among which 251 adopted an ESOP. Panel A shows the yearly distribution of listings and Panel B 
shows the industry composition of the sample firms. Firms are divided into 13 broad industry sectors following the 
industry-classification guideline announced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.  
 
A. Year distribution of listing 
 Listing of ESOP firms Listing of Non-ESOP firms 
1996 93 110 
1997 76 130 
1998 22 84 
1999 28 70 
2000 32 105 
B. Industry composition of sample firms 
 ESOP firms Non-ESOP firms 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 6 (2.4%) 19 (3.8%) 
Mining 1 (0.4%) 11 (2.2%) 
Manufacturing 134 (53.4%) 315 (63.1%) 
Electricity, Gas, Water Supply 11 (4.4%) 18 (3.6%) 
Construction 4 (1.6%) 8 (1.6%) 
Transport & Storage 13 (5.2%) 21 (4.2%) 
Information Technology 14 (5.6%) 29 (5.8%) 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 24 (9.6%) 27 (5.4%) 
Finance & Insurance 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.4%) 
Real Estate 9 (3.6%) 6 (1.2%) 
Social Services 9 (3.6%) 22 (4.4%) 
Transmission & Culture 0 (0.0%) 4 (0.8%) 
Conglomerate 26 (10.4%) 17 (3.4%) 
Total 251 (100%) 499 (100%) 
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Table 3. Distribution of Employee Ownership under ESOPs 
This table shows the distribution of employee share ownership under the ESOP in the year when the firm goes 
public. EO represents employee ownership as a percentage of the firm’s total shares. 
 
EO range (%) 
(As the percentage of total tradable 
and non-tradable shares) 
(As the percentage of total 
tradable shares) 
Mean EO (%) Number of firms Mean EO (%) Number of firms 
1—5 2.9 56 4.0 5 
5—10 7.7 51 7.4 23 
10—15 12.6 88 12.7 19 
15—20 17.3 21 17.4 14 
20—25 22.4 16 23.5 10 
25—30 27.7 9 27.5 23 
30—35 32.1 4 33.1 17 
35—40 37.6 2 38.8 15 
40—45 41.4 2 43.1 19 
45—50 48.1 2 47.8 19 
50—55   52.4 21 
55—60   58.3 12 
60—65   62.3 7 
65—70   67.4 3 
70—75   73.1 5 
75—80   77.2 6 
80—85   82.3 5 
85—90   89.6 3 
90—95   92.9 5 
95—100   97.5 4 
Above 100   148.8 16 
ALL 12.0 251 46.2 251 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for selected firm variables for the total sample and the matched sample, separating 
ESOP from non-ESOP firms. The total sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from January 1996 to December 2000 among which 251 adopted an ESOP. The data cover the eight-year 
period from 1996 to 2003. We obtain the data from two widely used databases of Chinese firms: the Financial 
Information Database distributed by Genius Information Technology Co. and the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting 
Research Database distributed by Guo Tai An Information Technology Co. The matched sample consists of 189 pairs of 
ESOP and non-ESOP firms that are matched by size, industry, and listing year. Firm age is calculated as the number of 
years of a firm’s incorporation. The data on employees are available only for the years of 1999–2003. 
 
Variable Mean Median Stand. Dev.  Observation 
A: Total sample 
ESOP firms:     
 Asset (Millions RMB) 1,381.95 1,013.08 1,529.05 1,413 
 Sales (Millions RMB) 684.61 406.75 901.37 1,409 
 Total employees 2,495.90 1,657.00 2,976.87 861 
 State Ownership (%) 24.97 24.97 21.46 1,412 
 Legal Person Ownership (%) 30.18 27.53 21.60 1,412 
 Debt-to-Equity 0.20 0.07 0.70 1,386 
 Firm Age at IPO (year) 4.61 4.00 2.14 251 
     
Non-ESOP firms:     
 Asset (Millions RMB) 2,445.31 1,014.63 13,662.80 2,714 
 Sales (Millions RMB) 1,128.11 443.73 2,400.00 2,712 
 Total employees 2,800.23 1,799.00 3,206.68 1,807 
 State Ownership (%) 32.95 36.12 30.22 2,714 
 Legal Person Ownership (%) 32.34 27.36 29.77 2,714 
 Debt-to-Equity 0.15 0.05 0.50 2,676 
 Firm Age at IPO (year) 2.16 1.00 3.71 499 
B. Matched sample 
ESOP firms:     
 Asset (Millions RMB) 1,397.00 1048.40 1,340.48 1,060 
 Sales (Millions RMB) 705.70 423.24 924.81 1,056 
 Total employees 2,702.06 1,826.50 3,094.26 652 
 State Ownership (%) 26.03 26.46 22.19 1,059 
 Legal Person Ownership (%) 29.12 25.47 21.78 1,059 
 Debt-to-Equity 0.20 0.08 0.68 1,040 
 Firm Age at IPO (year) 4.65 4.00 2.04 189 
     
Non-ESOP firms     
 Asset (Millions RMB) 1,335.33 970.75 1,396.42 1,060 
 Sales (Millions RMB) 771.97 436.60 1,193.18 1,060 
 Total employees 2,433.97 1,903.50 2,164.39 638 
 State Ownership (%) 33.53 36.12 29.20 1,060 
 Legal Person Ownership (%) 30.97 24.35 28.17 1,060 
 Debt-to-Equity 0.15 0.05 0.38 1,040 
 Firm Age at IPO (year) 2.30 1.00 3.08 189 
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Table 5. Pattern of Tradable Shares: ESOP Firms vs. Non-ESOP Firms 
This table compares percentage changes in the number of total tradable shares between ESOP and non-ESOP firms 
in the first six years after listing. The total sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from January 1996 to December 2000. The matched sample consists of 189 pairs of ESOP and non-
ESOP firms that are matched by size , industry, and listing year. The t-statistic is reported for the difference in the 
percentage change between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 





A. Total sample 
IPO year 15.24% 14.35%  0.90% 0.41 749 
Year 2 31.48% 30.79%  0.70% 0.23 749 
Year 3 34.47% 19.87%  14.60%*** 4.82 750 
Year 4 69.88% 15.79%  54.09%*** 16.96 749 
Year 5 12.37% 15.46%  -3.09% -0.87 612 
Year 6 11.65% 12.42%  -0.77% -0.29 514 
B. Matched sample 
IPO year 14.37% 17.21%  -2.84% -0.92 378 
Year 2 28.66% 35.08%  -6.42% -1.58 378 
Year 3 37.78% 20.90%  16.88%*** 3.54 378 
Year 4 69.31% 12.74%  56.57%*** 12.47 377 
Year 5 13.79% 19.96%  -6.17% -1.11 325 
Year 6 10.29% 15.21%  -4.92% -1.44 282 
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Table 6. Base Regressions of Firm Performance 
This table presents the regressions of four performance measures, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), and Tobin’s q, for both 
the total sample and the matched sample. The total sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1996 to 
December 2000. The matched sample consists of 189 pairs of ESOP and non-ESOP firms that are matched by size, industry, and listing year. ESOP is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm adopts an ESOP, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables 
(Total sample) (Matched sample) 
ROA ROE ROS Tobin's q ROA ROE ROS Tobin's q 
ESOP 0.14 0.13 1.35* -0.03 0.25 0.07 0.33 -0.04
  (0.80) (0.31) (1.84) (-0.72) (1.01) (0.11) (0.30) (-0.71)
   
ln(Total asset) 0.42*** 1.85*** 0.98** -0.88*** 0.26 2.20*** 1.98*** -0.97***
  (4.26) (8.20) (2.44) (-40.44) (1.61) (5.00) (2.71) (-28.68)
   
Debt-to-equity ratio -1.44*** -1.74*** -4.91*** -0.10*** -1.70*** -2.88*** -7.44*** -0.15***
  (-9.36) (-3.62) (-7.77) (-2.90) (-8.62) (-3.59) (-7.77) (-3.17)
   
State shares (%) 0.03*** 0.04** 0.04 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01***
  (3.57) (2.39) (1.27) (6.61) (1.17) (0.38) (-1.13) (3.85) 
         
Legal person shares (%) 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04 0.01*** 0.02* 0.03 -0.04 0.01***
  (3.71) (2.63) (1.31) (8.38) (1.88) (0.91) (-0.79) (5.14) 
         
Firm age -0.12*** -0.12** -0.48*** -0.02*** -0.18*** -0.23** -0.70*** -0.01 
 (-5.56) (-2.54) (-5.51) (-3.66) (-4.31) (-2.05) (-3.73) (-1.47) 
         
Intercept 3.77*** -0.53 10.17*** 7.65*** 5.57*** -0.32 9.26 8.37*** 
 (4.39) (-0.27) (2.90) (40.40) (4.02) (-0.09) (1.50) (29.64) 
         
Exchange dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.48 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.45 
Observation 3,981 3,983 3,972 3,978 2,036 2,038 2,032 2,038
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Table 7. By-Year Regressions of Firm Performance 
This table reports the regressions of four performance measures, ROA, ROE, ROS, and Tobin’s q, separately for each of the six years after listing. The model 
specifications are the same as those in Table 6. For each regression, we only report the coefficient on the ESOP dummy. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 (Total sample) (Matched sample) 
IPO year Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 IPO year Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
ROA:             
 ESOP dummy -0.19 0.25 0.12 0.24 0.57 0.44 -0.10 0.01 0.31 0.64 -0.44 0.06 
 t-statistic (-0.77) (0.66) (0.26) (0.51) (1.15) (0.80) (-0.28) (0.02) (0.49) (1.02) (-0.61) (0.08) 
 Observation 733 719 718 722 591 498 371 358 360 360 314 273 
             
ROE:             
 ESOP dummy -0.99*** -0.19 0.15 -0.17 1.33 1.56 -1.06* -1.03 1.31 1.09 -0.26 -0.88 
 t-statistic (-2.62) (-0.27) (0.14) (-0.15) (1.02) (1.18) (-1.87) (-0.92) (0.78) (0.56) (-0.14) (-0.42) 
 Observation 737 724 722 719 590 491 373 361 361 360 313 270 
             
ROS:             
 ESOP dummy 0.08 0.90 2.95* 2.47 1.32 1.47 0.16 0.58 1.13 2.31 -2.89 -4.52 
 t-statistic (0.08) (0.63) (1.79) (1.22) (0.67) (0.54) (0.12) (0.24) (0.39) (0.86) (-1.02) (-1.24) 
 Observation 731 720 718 719 589 495 371 363 360 357 310 271 
             
Tobin's Q:             
 ESOP dummy -0.17* 0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.18 -0.13 
 t-statistic (-1.79) (1.05) (0.66) (0.18) (-1.27) (-0.06) (-1.07) (0.36) (0.45) (0.66) (-1.50) (-0.94) 
 Observation 735 728 721 713 584 497 374 365 364 357 308 270 
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Table 8. Production Function Regressions 
This table presents the regressions of firm production for the total sample and the matched sample. The total 
sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1996 to 
December 2000. The matched sample consists of 189 pairs of ESOP and non-ESOP firms that are matched by size, 
industry, and listing year. The data on labor are available starting in 1999, so the regressions in this table are run 
for the period of 1999–2003. We define output as value added, which we measure by total sales minus direct 
operating costs. ESOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm adopts an ESOP, and zero 
otherwise. Control variables include debt-to-equity ratio, state shares, legal-person shares, and firm age, for which 
the coefficients are not reported. The  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 




Dependent variable: ln(Output) 
(Total sample) (Matched sample) 
Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog 
ESOP -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.88) (-0.78) 
     
ln(Capital) 1.02*** 1.13*** 1.03*** 0.59* 
 (53.04) (6.32) (32.65) (1.66) 
     
ln(Labor) 0.11*** -0.17 0.10*** 0.28 
 (7.26) (-1.37) (3.88) (1.25) 
     
ln(Capital) × ln(Capital)  -0.04**  0.04 
  (-2.12)  (1.16) 
     
ln(Labor) × ln(Labor)  -0.007  -0.01 
  (-0.78)  (-0.50) 
     
ln(Capital) × ln(Labor)  0.05***  -0.01 
  (2.63)  (-0.20) 
     
Intercept -3.26*** -2.64*** -3.29*** -2.36* 
 (-21.92) (-3.73) (-12.06) (-1.7) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Exchange Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.61 0.61 
     
Observation 2,585 2,585 1,251 1,251 
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Table 9. IPO Pricing: ESOP Stocks vs. Non-ESOP Stocks 
This table presents the comparison of stock value in the IPO year between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. The total 
sample consists of all 750 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 1996 to 
December 2000. The matched sample consists of 189 pairs of ESOP and non-ESOP firms matched by size (firm 
sales), industry, and listing year. We calculate the market value for total tradable shares at the stock’s first-day 
closing price. The t-statistics are reported for differences between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 





A: Total sample 
First-day closing price (RMB) 14.58 14.98  -0.41  -0.82 735 
MV at the first-day closing (million RMB) 529.55 698.98  -169.43***  -5.33 735 
IPO offer price (RMB) 6.24 5.80  0.44**  2.36 735 
IPO initial return (%) 159.05 245.38  -86.32***  -3.45 735 
B. Matched sample 
First-day closing price (RMB) 14.55 14.34  0.21  0.37 371 
MV at the first-day closing (million RMB) 538.03 578.59  -40.56  -1.20 371 
IPO offer price (RMB) 6.27 5.34  0.93***  3.81 371 
IPO initial return (%) 154.47 307.31  -152.84***  -4.28 371 
 
 
